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How the Danes Discovered Britain: The International Integration of the Danish Dairy Industry 
Before 1880
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Paul Sharp, University of Southern Denmark 
Abstract: The success of Danish agricultural exports at the end of the nineteenth century is 
often attributed to the establishment of a direct trade with Britain. Previously, exports went 
mostly via Hamburg, but this changed with the loss of Schleswig and Holstein to Prussia in the 
war of 1864. After this, quantity and price data imply narrowing price gaps and thus imply gains 
for Danish producers. Why then did Denmark not discover the British market earlier? We show 
that butter markets in both countries were integrated in the eighteenth century, but through 
the Hamburg hub. We then demonstrate that there were sound economic reasons for this well 
into the nineteenth century. However, movements to establish a direct trade were afoot from 
the 1850s. Thus, although the war certainly gave an extra boost to the process, the shock from 
the loss of the Duchies was not necessary for the future Danish success. 
Keywords: Butter, dairies, Denmark, hubs, international trade, market integration 
JEL codes: F1, L1, N5, N7, Q1 
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1. Introduction 
A commemorative medal produced for a large exhibition of industry and art in Copenhagen in 
1872 bore the words of the poet H.P. Holst: ‘Hvad udad tabes, skal indad vindes’, or ‘What 
outside is lost, must inside be won’. With the loss of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein to 
Prussia in the Second Schleswig War of 1864, this soon became a sort of national motto for 
Denmark and remains a potent national symbol of strength at a time of adversity even to today. 
Thus, Mordhorst (2014, p. 121) quotes a speech by the then Danish Prime Minister, who, 
marking the centenary of the Federation of Danish Cooperatives in 1999, stated that the 
cooperative movement was ‘part of the history of the country of Denmark, which won inwardly 
what we lost outwardly after the catastrophe in 1864, when we lost two-thirds of our precious 
country’, and marking the 150th anniversary in 2014 in front of the queen and other dignitaries, 
the present prime minister stated2 that 
‘Out of the defeat in 1864 grew the modern Denmark. With democracy. With a 
well-educated population. With equality between the sexes. Freedom for the 
individual. And the whole of our welfare society based on solidarity.’ 
 
In fact this idea runs through both Danish literature (Westergaard 1922, pp. 19-20) and 
international literature on Denmark based on it, such as the internationally influential paper by 
Kindleberger (1951, pp. 35-36, 40-41, 44-45). Seemingly as proof of this, within a couple of 
decades of 1864, the Danish economy was rapidly catching up to the world’s leading 
economies, led by Danish agriculture, particularly dairying, which became the envy of the 
world. 
We nuance the story about the importance of 1864 by taking the story of the important butter 
trade back to the eighteenth century. We gather all available information on this from before 
1864, and show that in terms of direct exports to Britain, 1864 did indeed mark a sudden break. 
We then, however, turn to price records to demonstrate that markets were integrated between 
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Copenhagen and London even before this date, but via Hamburg. In fact, until the 1860s, 
Denmark was very dependent on this hub, particularly for exports to Britain, but then she 
rapidly developed her own infrastructure, in particular direct trading routes with Britain, and 
these were to prove to be of vital importance for the expanding agricultural exports. Of course, 
the 1864 war made trade via Hamburg if not impossible at least politically unacceptable – but 
trading directly with Britain would presumably reduce costs considerably, by cutting out the 
expensive Hamburg middlemen. So really the important question is why Denmark ever traded 
via Hamburg, and how such a sudden reorientation was possible, if it had not been before the 
war, despite the seemingly obvious advantages, as reflected even by the frustration of 
contemporaries as we demonstrate below. 
The usual explanations for this often emphasize the role of the war of 1864 for stimulating a 
sense of national consciousness, reflected by the words of Holst, as well as promoting the 
importance of the direct connection with Britain, which was to become so important for the 
export trade.  
Our answer considers the literature on service clusters and export hubs, as well as the question 
as to how lesser developed countries can escape path dependencies embodied in traditional 
trading patterns and bring home the high value added parts of their export trade. The 
connection between market integration and path dependency is a relevant topic in economic 
history. Although the market integration literature mostly focuses on determining the width 
and depth of markets in space, business historians have provided evidence that connecting 
markets and organizing foreign trade is far from trivial. Especially the fundamental problem of 
gaining reliable information on foreign markets and establishing functioning exchange and 
distribution networks has attracted wide attention. In preindustrial times, often substantial 
specific investments in these networks and the protection of business abroad had to be made 
(Greif 2000, Grafe/Gelderbloom 2010), and it took large shocks, such as wars and revolutions, 
to reorient existing networks (Schulte Beerbühl 2013). For nineteenth century markets in 
sophisticated agricultural products such as wine, where quality uncertainty and cheating 
prevailed, the problems of establishing reliable distribution channels abroad to overcome 
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information asymmetries between producers, merchants and producers abroad have been 
highlighted repeatedly (Simpson 2004, Stanziani 2010).3 Under these circumstances, centers 
that facilitate circulation and verification of information on quality of agents and business 
practices in foreign countries as well as credit availability and commodity storage are at a clear 
advantage over peripheral trading locations. Theoretically, a simple model by Krugman (1993) 
demonstrates that such transportation hubs are favorable locations for industries subject to 
increasing returns, and that the location of a hub can be self-sustaining, thus giving a role for 
historical accident and subsequent path dependency.  
The present paper, in this sense, examines a relevant case study in which both historical 
advantages of a trade hub weakened, and a considerable shock assisted overcoming existing 
path dependency. Thus, in our interpretation, the Second Schleswig War certainly provoked the 
sudden change in the historical trading relationship with Hamburg, but the story is rather more 
nuanced than simply being a reflection of national consciousness after 1864: Hamburg was 
certainly initially important, since it provided services that Denmark could not, for example 
expert market information, credit, and regular connections with England, the latter particularly 
important given the perishable nature of butter. As the first era of globalization moved on, 
however, the persistence of the use of the Hamburg hub became less obviously economically 
justifiable. At the same time as the costs of trading via Hamburg were increasing, we argue that 
the benefits were also decreasing. First, the costs of establishing a direct connection with 
England fell with the price of steam shipping and the telegraph, and with the liberalization of 
British trade policy. Second, the benefits of the Hamburg hub were decreasing with the 
abolition of the Sound Toll (which was payable by any ships entering the Sound between 
Helsingør in Denmark and Helsingborg in Sweden) in 1857, which made Copenhagen a more 
attractive port than it had been. And finally, the commercial and credit crisis in Hamburg in late 
1857 also contributed to its relative loss of centrality in trade between Britain and Southern 
Scandinavia over the following decade or so. 
3
 Ekberg and Lange (2014) argue that even in the late twentieth century individual enterprises, such as shipping 
companies were of crucial importance in the process of globalization, for reasons closely related to those outlined 
above. 
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We combine quantitative information such as price and trade data with an analysis of 
contemporary publications from German, Danish and British sources to trace the simultaneous 
process of the establishment of export dairies, the construction of new trade networks and 
steamship connections to England for direct export, and the discovery of the quality of Danish 
estate butter by British merchants and consumers. We observe that from the 1850s this model 
trickled down from a pioneering group of large estate owners, via packing firms and private 
creameries to medium landowners, and ultimately to the common farmer (or peasant) through 
the cooperative movement. As Denmark developed, the Hamburg hub became less important, 
and eventually the entire country became its own dairy cluster, and even started to re-export 
other countries’ dairy produce. This capture of the high value added part of the production 
process was of major importance for the Danish development story.4 
This process also provides in depth-insights into a representative case of late nineteenth-
century agricultural globalization. The nineteenth century experienced the integration of 
national and international markets for all sorts of products, and the concomitant ‘Great 
Specialization’ between urbanized, industrialized regions and agricultural ‘hinterlands’ within 
countries, and the formation of a core-periphery model with industrialized countries, above 
and first of all Britain, in the center, exchanging their industrial surplus production for food and 
raw materials with ‘peripheral’, mainly agricultural economies. In a process resembling von 
Thünen’s rings of specialization (Kopsidis 2014), the perishability of individual commodities, 
relative factor endowments and absolute geographical advantages marked the potential extent 
of this specialization. As a consequence, international trade in agricultural commodities grew at 
rates above 3 percent from (at least) 1850 until the First World War (Aparicio et al 2009, pp. 53-
5, 61-3). In this process, diminishing growth rates of initially dominant origins and commodities, 
such as wheat, were at least partially offset by new countries and formerly untradeable 
commodities entering this process, such as fresh fruits and vegetables (Pinilla/Ayuda 2008, 
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 Some of our findings mirror Keller et al (2011, pp. 873-877), who assesses why after 1842 Hong Kong emerged as 
an important entrepôt for overseas imports into China, in part due to geographical location and in part because of 
its cluster of knowledge and contacts for penetrating the Chinese market. 
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2010), eggs or the subject of the present study, dairy products, thanks to their higher income-
demand elasticities and technological advances in both production and transportability. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we first provide a 
quantitative description of the structure of Danish trade in the nineteenth century based on the 
available data. We also provide an econometric analysis of butter prices from London, Hamburg 
and Copenhagen, using error correction models and cointegration analysis to demonstrate how 
market integration of Denmark with Britain through Hamburg changed into direct integration 
with Britain. Moreover, the narrowing of the Anglo-Danish price gap we identify provides some 
indication of the benefits of this for the Danish economy. Then in Section 3 we provide a more 
qualitative approach, emphasizing the changes that were already happening in the first half of 
the century, and demonstrating how a number of factors came together around the 1850s and 
’60s which helped propel Denmark into an almost total reliance on the direct export trade to 
Britain. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. From Hamburg to the UK: The Reorientation of the Danish Butter Export Trade 
2.1. Evidence from Trade Statistics 
Exports of butter5 were considered a state secret until 1820 (Drejer 1962, p. 21) and if statistics 
were kept, they have not been preserved, which makes it less than straightforward to trace the 
evolution of Danish butter exports, or any other exports before this point. The first meaningful 
trade statistics, the Eksportstatistiske Tabeller (‘Export Statistical Tables’) start in 1820 only, 
giving information on grain exports first, adding tables on butter and cheese from 1821 (Boje 
1977, p. 57-60). From these series, which are preserved in the Danish National Archives and run 
to 1834, we can assess the total exports per product of the Danish Monarchy including the 
Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein (but not the free port of Altona, which is listed as a 
destination), henceforth ‘Greater Denmark’, and the distribution of export destinations. We can 
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also assess the share of each entity and the different regions of Denmark proper (the 
continental peninsula of Jutland and the islands of Funen, Zealand and Lolland-Falster) in the 
total, as well as a breakdown by customs districts. Unfortunately, however, it is not possible to 
know the destinations of exports for each of the constituent parts of ‘Greater Denmark’, 
although it is the reorientation of trade by the Kingdom, i.e. Denmark proper, which interests 
us here. 
Nevertheless, for the whole of ‘Greater Denmark’ we can see a clear pattern in this early 
period, as illustrated in Table 1. More than 70 percent of all butter exports went to Hamburg 
and the adjacent Danish free port of Altona (which is today a district of Hamburg), and together 
with the Baltic Hanseatic port of Lübeck more than 75 percent went to port cities. For the rest, 
we can see an increasing share of direct exports to England and Scotland, and a decreasing 
share of exports to Norway, which had been ruled by the King of Denmark until 1814. 
Table 1: Butter export destinations (%) and total exports (tønder of 112 kg) for Denmark
and the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, 1821-34 
Abstract Altona Hamburg Lübeck 
Other 
Germany Britain Norway Sweden Other Total 
1821-4 23.0 50.4 6.7 10.2 0.8 7.9 0.1 0.9 42,782 
1825-9 22.5 49.2 3.5 9.5 6.4 7.8 0.1 1.0 51,863 
1830-4 27.5 44.3 3.4 8.0 9.1 4.9 0.0 2.8 48,682 
1821-34 24.4 47.8 4.4 9.2 5.7 6.8 0.1 1.6 48,132 
Source: Eksportstatistiske Tabeller 1821-1834. 
Note: ‘Other Germany’ includes returns for ‘Germany’, Bremen, Hannover, Mecklenburg, Oldenburg (incl. Eutin), 
Prussia and the ports of Rostock, Stettin, Stralsund and Wismar; it does not include Helgoland and destinations 
given as ‘North Sea’ or ‘Baltic’. 
However, as Figure 1 shows, the exports of butter from Denmark proper accounted for a 
relatively small fraction of total exports from ‘Greater Denmark’ in this period, i.e. 28.8 percent 
on average. More importantly, Danish economic historians (especially Boje 1977, pp. 66-72) 
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have highlighted that the distribution of export destinations was probably somewhat different 
for the Kingdom of Denmark than for the Duchies. In the former the importance of the 
traditional market of Norway was much higher than in the aggregate, and Altona would have 
taken a larger share than Hamburg, although much of the latter was simply passing through the 
Danish free port to the Hanseatic City. 
Figure 1: Total exports of butter from ‘Greater Denmark’, 1821-1834 
Sources: ‘Exports Denmark and Duchies’ as Table 1; ‘Exports from DK’: Boje (1977, p. 316). 1 tønde of butter = 
112kg. 
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This can be confirmed for the period 1838 to 18526 when we have, from the first published 
Danish trade statistics, an overview of the destinations of butter exports for Denmark proper, 
which we have aggregated in the same way as before in Table 2.7 For the period before the First 
Schleswig War (1848-51) 38.4 percent of exports went to Norway, and another 44.8 percent to 
Altona, while the shares of Hamburg and Germany are much smaller than for ‘Greater 
Denmark’ in Table 1. ‘Other destinations’ are also slightly more important, among which the 
Danish possessions of Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands dominate alongside the Danish 
West Indies. The shares of Lübeck and of direct exports to Britain are similar to the Denmark 
and Duchies aggregate before the war.  
Table 2: Shares of exports of butter from Denmark by destination (in %) and total exports (in
tønder), 1838-52 
Altona Hamburg Lübeck 
Other 
Germany Britain 
Norway and 
Sweden Other Total 
1838-42 47.2 0.6 3.5 0.3 13.7 31.1 3.6 16,941 
1843-47 42.4 0.4 0.9 0.3 5.4 45.7 4.9 11,589 
1848-51 12.0 5.0 8.6 0.5 21.2 47.6 5.2 13,659 
1852 21.9 0.7 2.5 1.3 11.3 60.0 2.5 21,351 
1838-52 34.5 1.7 3.9 0.4 12.8 42.3 4.4 14,576 
Source: Statistisk Tabelværk. Altona includes the small neighboring port of Wandsbek. 1 tønde of butter = 112kg. 
During the First Schleswig War (1848-51), we observe increasing direct exports to both the 
Hanseatic Towns of Hamburg and Lübeck, but especially to Britain and Norway. In part, this 
seems to reflect the reversal of a former trend away from butter exports to Britain (sometimes 
linked to the repeal of the British Corn Laws which fostered grain exports, see Boje 1977, pp. 
6
 For 1835-37 trade statistics are partially missing and partially published in a periodical called Handels- og Industri-
Tidende. The format of the available data is similar to that of the Eksportstatistiske Tabeller and no important shifts 
in trade can be observed, so we omitted these years in the tables. 
7
 Sweden and Norway have been added up since they are reported jointly in the trade statistics for 1844 to 1847. 
However, the share of Sweden in 1838-1843 and 1848-52 in total exports is only marginal, on average 0.25 
percent, with a maximum of 0.36 percent in 1852. 
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62-68). At the same time, the importance of Altona shows a marked decline. Note that there is 
no overall decline in the volume of butter exports from Denmark during the war. The notable 
trade diversion from Altona towards Norway, Britain, Hamburg and Lübeck might be an effect 
of the war that cut trade routes to Altona and though the Duchies, and it might also reflect 
some of the efforts to establish direct trade connections to Britain described below. However, 
already for 1852, we see a marked reorientation back towards Altona (again taking 21.9 
percent of exports) and a reduction in the British share to 11.3 percent,8 while the share of 
exports to Norway is still rising. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess whether these changes and reversals persisted, since in 
1853 the Danish government ceased to publish accounts of the destinations of the exports from 
the different parts of ‘Greater Denmark’. Thus, destinations are given in the trade statistics only 
for the sum of Denmark and the Duchies until 1861 and for Denmark and Schleswig (excluding 
Holstein and Lauenburg) for 1862 and 1863.  
Of course, after the Second Schleswig War and the loss of the Duchies in 1864, Danish trade 
statistics and their accounts of destinations of exports refer to Denmark only. For the first years 
after the war (1864-68), we observe an almost complete reorientation of trade, with more than 
two thirds of butter exports going to Britain, with a much reduced orientation towards Norway 
and a clear loss of importance of both Altona (now probably included under ‘Duchies’), 
Hamburg and Lübeck. Also, and importantly, total exports doubled between 1848-52 and 1864-
67, and from there continued to increase at a fast pace. These patterns were to remain and be 
reinforced after the 1880s, until finally in 1900 around 90 percent of Danish butter exports 
would go to Britain. 
8
 From 1851 to 1852, however, export volumes increase a lot, so that the absolute volume exported to Britain in 
1852 is just 2.5 percent below the 1851 volume (but 29 percent below the 1850 wartime maximum). 
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Table 3: Shares of exports of butter from Denmark by destination (in %) and total exports (in
tønder), 1865-72 
Duchies Altona  Hamburg Lübeck 
Other 
Germany Britain 
Norway and 
Sweden Other Total 
1864 7.7 - 1.4 0.9 0.0 64.2 23.2 3.6 39,939 
1865-67 11.9 - 0.7 0.7 0.1 64.0 20.5 3.3 42,805 
1868-72 9.7 - 0.1 0.3 0.1 81.9 6.8 1.4 62,487 
1873-77 8.3 - 0.3 0.5 0.2 83.7 6.2 0.7 123,081 
1878-81 7.2 - 0.4 0.4 0.0 84.8 6.4 0.8 106,898 
1864-81 9.0 - 0.4 0.5 0.1 79.1 9.7 1.5 84,421 
Source: Statistisk Tabelværk. Altona is now included in the Duchies, which refer to Schleswig, Holstein and 
Lauenburg. 1864 refers to the 1864/65 fiscal year (after the war). 1 tønde of butter = 112kg. 
This leaves the important question of what happened between 1852 and 1864. Was the Danish 
reorientation a gradual process already starting with the First Schleswig War, or were trade 
patterns reversed again towards Altona and indirect exports via Hamburg? There are three 
ways to assess this, none of them perfect. The first is to look at the distribution of the exports 
of Denmark and the Duchies during this period, to see if there is a more general trend towards 
Britain. Then, we can also look at British import statistics to see if Denmark is gaining a larger 
share. And finally, we can look at the import and export statistics of Hamburg.9  
9
 Note that the fourth option - looking at Altona’s trade statistics - is impossible, since comprehensive trade or 
shipping statistics are missing for this period. However, in previous work it has been found that Altona was 
something like a ‘junior partner’ to Hamburg in its export activities, and it thus turned out to be a reasonable 
assumption that its flows mimic more or less those of Hamburg – there was no customs border between them. See 
Lampe (2008, note 64, p. 146) for references. 
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Table 4: Shares of exports of butter from Denmark and the Duchies by destination (in %) and 
total exports (in tønder), 1838-62 
Altona  Hamburg Lübeck 
Other 
Germany Britain Norway  Sweden Other Total 
1838-42 22.5 54.7 1.8 0.6 8.2 7.6 0.1 4.5 75,064 
1843-47 27.9 56.4 1.9 1.1 1.3 8.1 - 2.8 72,054 
1848-51 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1852 17.7 83.2 4.4 1.8 5.1 26.1 0.2 2.0 52,680 
1853-57 16.4 64.7 2.1 0.3 4.7 9.7 0.3 1.7 75,187 
1858-62 13.3 65.6 2.0 0.8 6.0 10.8 0.7 0.8 76,420 
Source: Statistisk Tabelværk. Altona includes the neighboring small port of Wandsbek. ‘Other Germany’ after 1852 
also includes the Duchy of Lauenburg. In 1843-47 Sweden is included under Norway. 1 tønde of butter = 112kg. 
While data for the period of the 1848-51 war is missing for ‘Greater Denmark’, Table 4 suggests 
that no important changes in trade patterns can be discerned before 1863. At most, we can see 
the increasing trend of exports to Norway (especially in 1852), probably from Denmark, and a 
shift from trading via Altona to trading via Hamburg. The share of direct exports to Britain in 
1858-62 is no larger than in 1838-42. However, it might be possible that an increased share of 
exports from the Duchies to and via Hamburg concealed a different trend from the Kingdom of 
Denmark regarding direct exports to Britain. 
To shed light on this possibility, Table 5 offers a breakdown of British import statistics by origin, 
while Table 6 gives the quantities of butter imported into Britain from the relevant destinations, 
comparing them to the volumes reported in the corresponding export statistics. 
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Table 5: Shares of imports of butter into the United Kingdom by origin (in %) and total 
imports (in 1000 cwt), 1823-97 
Denmark 
Hamburg; 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
Germany 
(other) 
Holland 
and 
Belgium France 
Other 
Foreign 
Total 
imports 
1823-27 1.6 - 26.2 72.0 0.0 0.2 194 
1828-32 5.7 - 22.3 71.5 0.0 0.4 143 
1833-37 5.3 - 19.8 74.7 0.0 0.2 188 
1838-42 5.4 - 27.7 64.8 0.1 2.0 235 
1843-45 0.6 - 16.7 77.8 0.1 4.9 197 
1845-46 0.9 20.7 6.3 66.8 0.0 5.2 286 
1848-51 2.4 14.5 4.8 73.9 0.4 4.0 315 
1852 1.5 16.0 1.3 80.1 0.8 0.3 285 
1853-57 2.2 16.5 3.1 68.8 6.3 3.0 442 
1858-62 1.6 12.4 1.0 52.1 10.8 22.0 735 
1863-64 5.1 13.3 1.6 38.6 14.6 26.8 1,021 
1865-67 6.3 10.6 0.1 37.8 37.0 8.2 1,130 
1868-70 7.7 13.1 0.0 40.0 31.1 6.8 1,172 
1871-72 12.9 - 12.0 33.3 27.0 14.8 1,236 
1873-77 13.8 - 7.7 27.7 38.4 12.3 1,533 
1878-82 13.6 - 5.5 37.2 25.2 18.5 2,077 
1883-87 20.5 - 6.9 35.4 22.9 14.3 2,054 
1888-92 38.5 - 6.3 9.6 26.3 19.2 1,989 
1893-97 41.2 - 4.3 8.3 16.4 29.7 2,797 
Source: BPP (1830), pp. 2-3 (1823-29), Tables of the revenue, population, commerce, &c. of the United Kingdom 
and its dependencies (1830-1840, 1851-52); BPP (1854-55), p. 7 (1841-1850); Annual Statement of the Trade and 
Navigation of the United Kingdom (1853-1897). 1854 interpolated between 1853 and 1855. 
Notes: Years from 1875-85 corrected for margarine imports (Lampe and Sharp 2014). Before 1846, until 1858, 
Hamburg is listed under Hanse Towns, which theoretically also include Bremen and Lübeck. While Lübeck is never 
listed, Hanse Towns have been split into Hamburg and Bremen according to average shares in the total in 1858-62. 
Schleswig and Holstein are only listed from 1864 to 1870, when they make up a tiny fraction of the Hamburg and 
Schleswig-Holstein total (2%). ‘Other Germany’ is ‘all of Germany’ before 1846 and after 1870, and includes 
Prussia, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Hannover, Bremen, Oldenburg and Kniphusen between 1847 and 1869. Note that 
totals do not include imports from Ireland, which was part of the UK. 1 cwt (Imperial hundredweight) = 50.802345 
kg. 
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Table 6: Total imports of Butter from Denmark and Germany to the UK (in 1000 cwt), 1823-72 
Imports to UK from Exports to UK from 
Denmark Hamburg 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
Germany 
(other) Denmark 
‘Greater 
Denmark’ Hamburg 
1823-27 3.6 55.3 4.4 
1828-32 8.0 31.4 8.9 
1833-37 9.7 41.0 13.2 
1838-42 13.0 65.5 5.6 15.0 
1843-45 1.2 34.3 1.4 2.3 
1845-46 1.9 50.0 35.2 1.0 49.1 
1848-51 7.4 45.8 15.2 6.7 58.1 
1852 4.3 45.8 3.7 5.8 59.5 
1853-57 9.9 73.1 13.6 8.9 92.2 
1858-62 13.8 90.1 9.0 12.5 
1863-64 52.7 133.2 4.5 15.6 55.1 
1865-67 71.1 116.2 3.2 1.6 65.7 
1868-70 103.4 153.9 2.0 0.9 102.6 
1871-72 157.2 149.5 151.5 
Sources: See Tables 1 and 2 for Denmark, Table 5 for Britain and Table 7 for Hamburg. 
Notes: See Table 5. Schleswig-Holstein: Not listed in 1863 and 1868, average refers to years with data only (no zero 
values included). Exports to Britain from Denmark: 1863-4 is 1864 value only. Exports to Britain from Hamburg: no 
data for 1849 and from 1857, averages refer to years with data only. 1 cwt (Imperial hundredweight) = 50.802345 
kg. 
As much as the sketchy data allows, we can see that trade statistics are relatively coherent 
between the different countries when it comes to assessing levels and trends in the 
international butter trade. Thus, from Tables 5 and 6 we see that quantities and shares of direct 
Danish exports to Britain decrease in the years 1843/4 to 1846/7 and increase during the First 
Schleswig War, to decline afterwards. If we believe the British statistics, in the period from 1853 
to 1862, direct exports from Denmark were gradually increasing in absolute terms, although 
their growth was smaller than that of overall British butter imports before 1863. Already during 
the Second War, however, direct exports to Britain increased strongly, gaining even more pace 
afterwards and especially in the early 1870s, when butter became Denmark’s most important 
export item and British butter imports from Denmark become larger than those of all sorts of 
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German butter for the first time. After about 1880 they accelerated again when the cooperative 
movement took off and the dairy export industry developed fully. 
It remains however difficult to assess how much of Danish butter was actually traded to Britain 
via Altona and Hamburg in the period before 1864 due to the lack of trade statistics for Altona. 
We can, however, have a look at the sources of Hamburg’s imports since 1850 and check 
whether at least the assumption that there was substantial exchange between the Hanse City 
and its smaller Danish neighbor is correct.10 Furthermore, since it is unlikely that much butter 
was produced in Hamburg itself we can assume that – apart from consumption by its 
inhabitants – the structure of the sources of Hamburg’s butter imports resembles quite closely 
the proximate (Altona, Lübeck) and ultimate countries of origin of the butter that was exported 
from Hamburg to Britain. 
10
 There are import statistics for 1845-1848 in a volume published in 1850, but these refer to seaward imports of a 
selected number of goods only, among which butter is not listed (but it is listed as an export item, hence the data 
in Table 6). 
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Table 7: The sources of Hamburg’s imports, 1850-72 (%) and total imports (in Zentner of 50kg) 
Denmark 
by sea 
From 
and via 
Altona 
From 
and via 
Lübeck 
Duchies 
(exc. 
Altona) 
other 
Germany 
possibly 
Duchies 
other 
Germany 
not 
Duchies Other 
Total 
imports 
1850-51 1.6 40.6 8.1 0.0 28.2 20.1 1.3 159,669 
1852 0.0 55.6 1.7 0.0 25.7 16.7 0.3 142,436 
1853-57 0.1 53.0 2.3 0.0 17.3 26.8 0.5 169,035 
1858-62 0.0 38.8 3.9 0.0 17.7 35.1 4.5 136,917 
1863-64 0.0 46.9 1.9 0.0 14.1 27.8 9.3 164,492 
1865-67 0.0 41.9 7.6 1.0 13.5 34.2 1.7 168,644 
1868-70 0.0 38.0 21.5 0.6 11.7 26.8 1.4 221,434 
1871-72 0.0 41.5 31.9 0.0 13.2 9.7 3.6 239,977 
Sources: Tabellarische Übersichten des Hamburgischen Handels 1850-71. 
Note: Data for 1864 not entered; corresponding averages refer to years with data only. ‘From and via Altona’ 
comprises items ‘from and via Altona’ and ‘Altona-Kiel railway’; ‘From and via Lübeck’ comprises items ‘from and 
via Lübeck’, ‘Lübeck by cartload’, ‘Lübeck by railway’ and ‘Lübeck-Hamburg railway’; ‘Duchies (exc. Altona)’ refers 
to ‘Holstein by Lübeck-Hamburg railway’ (listed from 1865 only, before probably included under Lübeck); ‘Other 
Germany possibly Duchies’ refers to places North and East of Hamburg, i.e., Harburg and Lüneburg as well as 
‘Lower Elbe’ and unidentified landward imports ‘by cartload’. ‘Other Germany not Duchies’ refers to places and 
routes which do not require crossing Schleswig or Holstein, i.e., Upper Elbe, Hamburg-Berlin railway, East Frisia, 
Oldenburg, Bremen and the Weser River and Prussian ports at the Baltic Sea. The high share of ‘Other’ in the 1860s 
is due to a short-lived increase in butter imports from the United States. 
We see that effectively on average around 46 percent of Hamburg’s butter imports arrived 
from or via Altona, and almost another 20 percent arrives from places or routes which might 
originate in the Duchies. Direct imports from Denmark are negligible, except for the war year of 
1850, where they account for 3.2 percent of imports.  
Unfortunately, the practice of crediting overland imports with the railroad, waterway or river 
port from where or on which they were consigned makes it impossible to trace the sources of 
imports any further. It is, however, very likely that much of the butter exported from Denmark 
to Altona given in Table 2 ended up in Hamburg. From there, more than 75 percent of all 
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seaward exports were shipped to Britain in the period 1845-56 for which we have export 
data.11 
Table 8: Destinations of Hamburg’s seaward exports, 1845-56/1873 (%) and total seaward
exports (in Danish tønder) 
Britain Iberia America Other Total 
1845 69.0 21.7 7.5 1.9 29,977 
1846 75.8 14.4 8.4 1.4 26,695 
1847 81.9 11.7 4.8 1.7 41,020 
1848 79.1 14.7 5.7 0.5 25,616 
… 
1850 79.5 11.8 7.0 1.7 30,073 
1851 86.0 7.0 7.0 0.0 32,952 
1852 80.4 11.0 8.3 0.3 30,815 
1853 85.6 6.7 7.1 0.7 36,561 
1854 87.7 5.7 4.7 1.8 42,895 
1855 86.1 3.8 6.8 3.2 47,160 
1856 89.4 3.5 5.4 1.7 49,337 
… 
1873 85.8 0.6 7.2 6.3 64,634 
Sources: See Table 7. 
This exhaustive look at the available information on trade flows between Denmark, the 
Duchies, Hamburg and the UK presents a picture which is consistent with the traditional story 
of Danish trade. There was indeed a sudden shift after 1864, and butter exports before this 
date largely went through Hamburg. 
11
 When rudimentary export data becomes available in 1873, the share of exports to Britain is 85.8 percent. 
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2.2. Evidence from the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Price Statistics: Testing for Market 
Integration 
We turn now to the evidence from prices, which are commonly used to investigate the extent 
of integration between distant markets (see for example the survey by Federico 2012). One 
advantage of so doing is that relatively consistent price series are available for long periods not 
covered by the trade statistics. Also, by looking for cointegrating relationships between the 
available series, we expect to be able to identify integration between Denmark and the UK for 
periods before direct trade was taking place. Specifically, we hope to uncover the links between 
Denmark, Hamburg, and the UK, with integration from Denmark to the UK via Hamburg in the 
early period, and directly after 1864. Moreover, due to the Law of One Price, price gaps can be 
interpreted as giving some indication of the extent of transportation and transaction costs 
between locations. However, our analyses should be treated with caution, in particular in as 
much as they might be affected by changes over time in the composition of the goods to which 
the prices refer, for example relative quality changes. 
We divide our data into three periods, determined to some extent by the available annual data. 
Our first period is from 1748 to 1800. Our Danish prices are the July 1 prices (or closest 
available) for Funen butter in Copenhagen taken from Friis and Glamann (1958, pp. 261-78), 
who originally gathered these prices from the Copenhagen Price-Current. For Britain, we use 
Clark’s homogenized series from different sources (Clark 2004). For Hamburg we use the prices 
collected by Gerhard, Kaufhold and Engel (2001, pp. 56-57) from the Hamburg Price-Current, 
which refer mainly to Holstein butter.12 
Our second period runs from 1831-60. For Britain we use Klovland and Solar’s butter price 
series, which refers to Limerick and Waterford butter in London. For Denmark, we use 
Københavns Torvepriser (‘Copenhagen Market prices’) as reported by Drejer (1925-33, p. 323). 
Our Hamburg prices are from Jakobs and Richter (1935), who report indices of prices from the 
Hamburg commodity exchange. We have converted them back into prices by benchmarking 
12
 These are in Hamburg small tons of 108.45408 kg. 
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them to the 1904 Hamburg average top quotation given by Fick (1907, p. 21). Merchant Fick is 
Jacobs and Richter’s original source.  
For the analysis we perform below, we soon discovered that the years 1861-64 were very noisy 
and had a large impact on the estimation results. This is consistent with there being a structural 
break at this time – which the history suggests there should be – although this also means that 
we are unable to analyze the two periods in one estimation, since the model we employ 
assumes constant parameters. We discuss this more below, but for now it should be noted that 
the short time periods employed mean that we have relatively few observations, and thus the 
results should be considered merely indicative. Clearly, more frequent data would solve this 
problem, but none are available. 
We thus choose to start our last period in 1865, the year after the Duchies were lost to Prussia. 
Thus, our final period covers the years 1865-90. For this we also use the Klovland and Solar 
(2011) data for Britain, and Jakob and Richter (1935) for Hamburg, but since Drejer’s data only 
runs until 1878, we use a different price series, which is not available before 186013. This is the 
quotation for best estate butter reported in the Danish newspaper Berlingske Tidende (taken 
from Drejer 1925-33, p. 326), until 1878 and then from 1879 the prices for prima/highest 
export butter (Finest/Prima Manor) in the Copenhagen Brokers' Current14 (averages of first 
quotation in June, August, October and December, following the averaging practice of Klovland 
and Solar 2011). The latter quotation simply replaced the former as the reference for Danish 
butter prices (Hollmann 1906, p. 11), and both connect smoothly. We always use the highest 
price if a range is given. 
All prices have been converted into British pence per kg using mint parities (18.16 Danish 
kroner per pound and 20.43 German marks per pound) for the nineteenth century, after 
ensuring that exchange rates were stable over the long run. For the eighteenth century we use 
the exchange rates between Danish and British currency from Friis and Glamann (1958, pp. 78-
13
 Nevertheless, for the overlapping periods of 1860-78 the correlation in levels between both series is 0.983, and 
in first differences it is 0.973. In all years, the sign of change (increase/decrease) is the same for both series. 
14
 These data were kindly provided by Ingrid Henriksen, see Henriksen and O’Rourke (2005). 
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103)15 and between Hamburg and British currency from Denzel (2010), pp. 191-94, 207-213. 
The series are illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Prices of Butter in Denmark, Hamburg and London, 1748-1890 
Sources: See text. 
Since the British and the Danish series do not strictly refer to the same product (only in the very 
late 1870s did Danish butter become regularly quoted in the London Provisions Market 
reports), looking at the absolute price gaps is not fully informative (see also Lampe and Sharp 
2014). Nevertheless, clearly the prices are following the same general trends. To test this we 
15
 In accordance with the butter prices, we used the first July rate or closest available. 
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turn to a more formal analysis and estimate simple multivariate error correction models using 
the annual prices for the periods described above. Our econometric approach is inspired by the 
market integration literature (see for example Ejrnæs and Persson 2000, 2010). 
For the periods 1748-1800 and 1831-60, we estimate the following vector error correction 
model by maximum likelihood using PcGive 1316: 
∆∆∆ = 

0 00 0 
1 −  −  − 1 −  −  −  + 
 (1) 
where , , and  are the logarithms to the prices of Copenhagen, Hamburg, and London
butter respectively,  and  describe the speed of adjustment (error correction) to the
cointegrating relationships 1 −  −  −  and 1 −  −  − , the -coefficients
give the elasticities, t is a trend, and  is a constant. The residuals , , and  are assumed to
be iid. normally distributed (the misspecification tests are reported in the appendix). In each 
case we included two lags, which were the minimum found necessary to avoid autocorrelation 
in the residuals. The results are given in Table 9. Here we have also reported the Johansen test 
for cointegration (H0: r = 1 or 2), which suggested in both cases most strongly a rank of 2, and 
we thus allow for the less restrictive assumption of two cointegrating relationships17. The error 
correction (adjustment) coefficient, α, must be negative and significant to indicate error 
correction (i.e. that one variable adjusts to the other). β describes the equilibrium relationship 
and is expected to be negative (meaning a positive relationship). 
16
 Doornik and Hendry (2009) 
17
 This is thus also a rejection of the possibility of any of the series being stationary. Thus cointegration is the 
appropriate methodology. 
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Table 9: Error Correction Estimates, 1748-1800 and 1831-60 
(1a) – 1748-1800 (1b) – 1831-60 
Danish (Funen in Cph) [P_1] Danish (Copenhagen) [P_1] 
Hamburg [P_2] Hamburg [P_2] 
London (Clark) [P_3] London (K&S) [P_3] 
∆P_1 ∆P_2 ∆P_3 ∆P_1 ∆P_2 ∆P_3 
αa -1.01*** 0 0 -1.05
***
 0 0 
(0.16) - - (0.22) - - 
αb 0 -0.57
*** 0 0 -0.59*** 0 
- (0.09) - - (0.11) - 
[a] [b] [a] [b] 
(Hamburg  Denmark) (London  Hamburg) (Hamburg  Denmark) (London  Hamburg) 
β -0.60*** -0.93*** -0.79*** -0.56*** 
(0.13) (0.28) (0.12) (0.09) 
Constant -0.43*** -0.00 0.01 0.09 
(0.12) (0.28) (0.10) (0.13) 
Trend 0.00 -0.00** -0.00** -0.01*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log-likelihood 304.32 206.33 
H0: r=1 
0.126 0.738 
(p-value) 
H0: r=2 
0.632 0.862 
(p-value) 
Test of restrictions (p-
value) 
0.50 0.28 
N 51 28 
Standard errors in parentheses; 
***
 significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
The alpha coefficients indicate the speed of adjustment of one price to the other. Thus, since 
we expect to find that London prices are exogenous – i.e. that Britain is in macroeconomic 
terms a ‘large’ economy, whereas Hamburg and Copenhagen are (relatively) ‘small’ – this 
motivates the imposition of the zeroes on the last row of the alpha matrix, which describes how 
London prices adjust to the other prices. We also expect the London price to be determining 
the Hamburg price, which in turn should be determining the Copenhagen price, and this 
23 
motivates the other zero restrictions (Hamburg prices should not be adjusting to Copenhagen 
prices, and Copenhagen prices should not adjust directly to London prices). 
Thus,  measures the speed of adjustment of Copenhagen prices ( to changes in Hamburg
prices () with the long-run relationship described by the elasticity , and  measures the
speed of adjustment of Hamburg prices ( to changes in London prices () with the long-run
relationship described by the elasticity . Since we impose over-identifying restrictions, we
also get a test of these, which accepts the restrictions.18 The (Granger) causality thus runs as 
expected, from London to Hamburg and then from Hamburg to Copenhagen. Moreover, the 
coefficients are strikingly similar in both periods, which suggests strongly to us that trade from 
Denmark went to England via Hamburg, as the literature suggests. 
Finally, we estimate the following by maximum likelihood for the period 1865-90: 
∆∆∆ = 

0 00 0 
1 −  −  − 1 −  −  −  + 
 
(2) 
where , , and  are as above,  and  again describe the speed of adjustment to the
cointegrating relationships 1 −  −  −  and 1 −  −  − , the -coefficients
give the elasticities, and other parameters are defined as above. We again included two lags. 
Note that the difference is that in the first equation we now have   rather than  .
The results are given in Table 10. Here we have also reported the Johansen test for 
cointegration, which suggested in both cases most strongly a rank of 2, and we thus allow for 
the less restrictive assumption of two cointegrating relationships. 
18
 ‘Test of restrictions (p-value)’ in the table. 
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Table 10: Error Correction Estimates, 1865-90 
(2) 
Danish (Estate) [P_1] 
Hamburg [P_2] 
London (K&S) [P_3] 
∆P_1 ∆P_2 ∆P_3 
αa -0.55
*** 0 0 
(0.09) - - 
αb 0 -0.80
*** 0 
- (0.11) - 
[a] [b] 
(London  Denmark) (London  Hamburg) 
β -1.06
***
 -0.86
***
 
(0.12) (0.09) 
Constant 0.58** 0.01 
(0.25) (0.18) 
Trend -0.00*** -0.00*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Log-likelihood 199.88 
H0: r=1 
0.113 
(p-value) 
H0: r=2 
0.542 
(p-value) 
Test of restrictions (p-value) 0.57 
N 24 
Standard errors in parentheses; 
***
 significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
The interpretation follows that above. For equation (2), we again expect to find that London 
prices are exogenous, which motivates the imposition of the zeroes on the last row of the alpha 
matrix. Now, however, we also expect London prices to be determining both the Hamburg and 
Copenhagen prices, since the direct link from Copenhagen to Hamburg has been severed, and 
this motivates the other zero restrictions:  then measures the speed of adjustment of
Copenhagen prices ( to changes in London prices () with the long-run relationship
described by the elasticity , and  measures the speed of adjustment of Hamburg prices
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( to changes in London prices () with the long-run relationship described by the elasticity. Since we impose over-identifying restrictions, we also get a test of these, which accepts the
restrictions. The (Granger) causality runs again as we expect: London is now determining both 
Hamburg and Copenhagen prices directly. 
We can test more formally for the hypothesized structural break around 1864 by imposing the 
model for the previous period, where London drives Hamburg, which in turn drives 
Copenhagen (equation 1), on the post-1864 years. This hypothesis is strongly rejected with a p-
value of 0.008, implying that these data cannot support the causal structure of the previous 
model.  
Note the large constant in the first relationship in (2), suggesting that Danish butter by this time 
enjoyed a significant premium over the Irish butter we compare it to in London. Otherwise, we 
cannot glean much information from the constant terms due to changing price series for the 
same city and/or changing qualities over longer time periods. Thus, for example, since due to 
transportation costs and the Law of One Price Danish butter must have sold for more in London 
than it did in Copenhagen, if we were comparing like with like the constant in the first 
relationship of (2) would have been negative. So to explore this issue more fully, we illustrate 
two consistent price series for Copenhagen and London for the period 1831-70 in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Copenhagen Market Prices and Irish Prices in London for Butter, 1831-70 
Sources: Drejer (1925-33) and Klovland and Solar (2011). 
Although the prices follow similar short run fluctuations, consistent with there being market 
integration over the whole period, there is a clear break in the gap between London and 
Copenhagen prices before and after the early 1860s. Between 1856 and 1860, butter was on 
average 2.1 d/kg cheaper in London than in Copenhagen, while in 1865-9 the difference 
decreased to 1.0 d/kg. As a proportion of the London butter price, this meant a decrease in the 
price gap from 8.5 percent to 4.0 percent. Note that since we are not comparing like with like, 
the decline of the price gap by more than 50 percent is rather more informative than the 
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absolute values.19 We do not find it reasonable, given the shaky data, to attempt to calculate 
deadweight losses in the style of Federico (2008) and Federico and Sharp (2013). Nevertheless, 
the potential savings from such a massive fall in the price gap, when accumulated over years 
and decades, would no doubt be huge. 
All in all, we feel that the available information from both quantities and prices strongly 
supports the story that Danish markets were initially integrated with Britain through Hamburg 
prior to 1864, but integrated directly subsequently. Having demonstrated this, we now proceed 
to attempt to answer the two main questions posed in the introduction: Why did Denmark 
initially trade through Hamburg? And what changed and when? 
3. Making Historical Sense of the Data
3.1. Discovering Britain via Altona and Hamburg: Danish Dairy Exports before 1850 
To understand the developments underlying the quantitative evidence presented above on 
trade volumes and market integration, it is necessary to gain insights into three aspects of the 
trade in question: supply of dairy products, especially butter, in Denmark, demand for these 
products in Britain and the services of buying, transporting, financing and distribution between 
both points. Before turning to the link between Britain and Denmark, and the dependency on 
the Altona/Hamburg hub, we therefore look briefly at the demand in Britain and the early 
development of the Danish dairy industry. 
The Industrial Revolution had a huge impact on the demand for foodstuffs in Britain, and thus 
also on the demand for butter. On the one hand, between 1760 and around 1840, the 
population of Britain (excluding Ireland) grew from about 5.7 to 14.9 million, at an annual rate 
of about 1.2 percent (Wrigley 2004, p. 64). Most of this population growth fueled the increasing 
urbanization rate of the country and especially the growth of the industrial centers in Northern 
19
 In fact, as previously noted in the discussion of the constant term in equation (3), our price series for estate 
butter from 1860 in 1865-9 exceeds the London price for the mentioned Irish butter on average by 12 percent. 
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England. On the other hand, real wages grew very little over this same period (see Voth 2004, 
271-273, Allen 2009).20 After 1840, population growth continued, but also important 
improvements in living standards are observed, which led to an increased demand for luxury 
fats, like those contained in butter, both due to the increased number of consumers and an 
increasing per capita demand.21 This, in turn, led to a long-term increase in both absolute and 
relative prices (in comparison to other foodstuffs like grains) of butter and related dairy 
products in Britain. 
Table 11: Duties on Danish Produce 1825-97 
Butter Cheese Beef Pork Live oxen 
and bulls 
1825-42 £1 / cwt 10.5s. / cwt Prohibited* Prohibited* Prohibited 
1842-46 £1 / cwt 10.5s. / cwt 8s. / cwt 8s. / cwt 
Bacon & 
ham: 
14s. / cwt 
£1 / head 
1846-53 10s. / cwt 5s. / cwt Free Free Free 
1853-60 5s. / cwt 2.5s. / cwt Free Free Free 
1860-97 Free Free Free Free Free 
20
 There are substantial differences in the estimates of wage gains between so-called ‘optimists’ (like Lindert and 
Williamson 1983) and ‘pessimists’ (most prominently Feinstein 1998), mostly driven by the composition of the 
cost-of-living index and the individual price series used to deflate wages. According to Allen’s (2007) corrected 
Feinstein real wage index, the increase was 20.4 percent between 1770 and 1840, corresponding to 0.25 percent 
per year.  
21
 See the introduction of Lampe and Sharp (2014). 
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* Prohibition lifted for heavily salted beef and pork from 1827.
Source: BPP (1897). 
As illustrated in Table 11, this price trend was reinforced by relatively high specific tariffs for 
butter and related products in Britain, £1 per hundredweight between 1825 and 1846, reduced 
to 10 shillings in 1846, 5 shillings in 1853 and finally abolished in 1860. In ad valorem terms, this 
was equivalent to a 20-25 percent tariff before 1846, based on Clark’s butter prices described 
above, falling to 8-9 percent just before the repeal of the butter tariff. As a consequence of this 
relatively high tariff rate, the British market was largely reserved for Irish produce, which 
originated within the United Kingdom and was therefore duty-free. As can be seen in Figure 4, 
its share was above 60 percent in all years until 1854, in many years even higher than 75 
percent. As we have already seen in section 2.1, Danish produce (identified as such in the trade 
statistics) played virtually no role until the mid-1860s. But remember that this graph does not 
account for trade via Altona/Hamburg. 
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Figure 4: Shares of imports to Britain from Denmark and Ireland, and ad valorem equivalents 
of the British tariff on foreign butter, 1823-97 
Sources: BPP (1897) (tariff duties), Clark (2004) (prices), data underlying Table 5 and Lampe and Sharp (2014) 
(trade shares). 
As with the repeal of the Corn Laws, the sequence of reductions in the butter duties after 1846 
can probably be seen as a consequence of the increase in demand for butter, especially in the 
growing industrial centers, and an increase in prices due to the protection of producers who 
could not cope with the increasing demand. Hence, at least in part, the opening of the British 
market after 1846 and the related access to its burgeoning demand, should explain the 
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relatively low exports of Danish produce there before, even if the real numbers were disguised 
by the trade via Hamburg.22 
On the other side of the North Sea, we find a Kingdom of Denmark that after the Napoleonic 
Wars – including the Gunboat War against Britain, with the Bombardment of Copenhagen by 
the Royal Navy in 1807 – lived through a severe economic, agricultural and commercial crisis 
(Hansen 1984, pp. 100-121). 
Denmark had a long history of cattle exports, mainly from Jutland to Holland on the famous Ox 
Road connecting Viborg via Flensburg to Hamburg. This trade was important since the sixteenth 
century, and came to be dominated by Dutch traders from the second half of the seventeenth 
century (Petersen 1970, p. 84). Its importance was gradually reduced at the end of the 
eighteenth century, however, due to the protectionist policies of the Dutch and Danish 
authorities, as well as serious outbreaks of cattle plague (Appel 1924-32, pp. 250-69, Hünniger 
2010, p. 79). From then, the Danish oxen trade became more centered on the Duchies of 
Schleswig and Holstein, but cattle raising and fattening seems to have shown a declining trend 
into the 1800s (Appel 1924-32, pp. 270-71, 284, Graugaard 2006). 
Thus, in the 1700s, dairying was not an important activity in Danish agriculture and Danish 
estates were still reluctant to follow the conversion to dairying underway in the Netherlands by 
then (Appel 1924-32, pp. 279-80; Petersen 1970, pp. 84-85). We observe, however, a steady 
increase in the interest in dairy production over the eighteenth century (Appel 1924-32, pp. 
284).23 On the islands of Zealand, Funen and Langeland, apparently butter production was 
important on some estates, but only very occasionally export-oriented, with a focus on the 
Copenhagen market. The only trade in butter at this time was imports from Holland to 
22
 See Schmidt (1870), p. 530, for a near-contemporary Danish account on the importance of the reductions in the 
British butter duties. 
23
 For example, an early report on the already advanced Schleswig/Holstein dairy sector was translated into Danish 
from German in 1757 ‘Underretning om Hollænderierne udi Hertugdømmerne Slesvig og Holsteen’ in the 
periodical ‘Oeconomisk Journal’ (Appel 1924-32, p. 281). 
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Copenhagen, and in the late eighteenth century occasional imports from Britain (Bredkjær 
1924-32, p. 565; Drejer 1962, pp. 20-21, citing Pontoppidan 1760).24 
The growing interest in dairying in Denmark over the second half of the eighteenth century can 
be seen as the spreading of a trend from the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein together with a 
general agricultural reform movement towards convertible husbandry since the 1750s, led by 
eminent political figures and estate owners like Adam Gottlob Moltke, Andreas Peter Bernstorff 
and Christian Ditlev Reventlow (Dombernowski 1988, pp. 215, 312, 320). Moltke and Bernstorff 
were nobles from Mecklenburg and Hannover, respectively, and part of a larger group of 
northern German nobles in the service of the Danish king who also acquired agricultural estates 
in Denmark. They were salient figures in spreading the wider trend of what Danish historian 
Carsten Porskrog Rasmussen (2010) has called ‘innovative feudalism’ into Denmark proper: the 
development of the convertible husbandry system of Koppelwirtschaft on large landed estates 
in the former Danish Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein and in Mecklenburg over the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century. It introduced a new crop rotation system that gave rise to 
very large herds already in the early 1700s in Schleswig, including cool milk cellars, and 
specialized dairy equipment and staff. These estates quickly adopted a much stronger market 
orientation than peasant producers (Rasmussen 2010). These dairy units were called 
Holländereien (hollanderies) and were originally run by the members of a fairly large group of 
specialized early seventeenth century immigrants from the Netherlands, where dairying had 
already achieved high standards. Over the course of the eighteenth century, the denomination 
of origin of these specialists evolved into a generic name for expert dairy workers (Davids 1996, 
p. 148-49).
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, this pioneering Holstein system of 
dairying spread into Denmark proper, and at the same time was more and more developed 
towards a focus on continuous exports in the Duchies. In the 1840s, the prominent German 
24 The most notable exception was apparently the production of Thybo cheese in the small town of Thy in 
northwestern Jutland, which was exported to England (Drejer 1962, pp. 20-21). 
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travel writer Johann Georg Kohl observed that export production of butter, very much adapted 
to the English market in product characteristics and packaging, had emerged after the 
Napoleonic Wars (since about 1820) in the Duchies and was already spreading towards 
Northern Jutland and the islands of Denmark. Given that the focus on butter and exports to 
England is commonly understood to have taken off only after 1864, Kohl’s observations are 
particularly interesting. Even his predictions about the future ring partly true: at a time when 
dairying in Denmark proper was a far from dominant agricultural activity, he predicted that 
Denmark and the Duchies would eventually integrate as a land ‘not of milk and honey, but of 
milk and butter.’25 
Thus, Kohl gives a clear impression that there was already a focus on the English market from a 
very early date, especially in Holstein. Writing in 1846, he also gives some idea of developments 
before this date; he sees the trade connections with England as decisive, and he dates them as 
having started ‘about 25 years ago’. This he saw as promoting quality improvements in the 
butter of Holstein, so that it could compete with Irish and Dutch butter, and these innovations 
he noted were spreading rapidly to Jutland and the islands of Denmark, largely through the 
hiring of (female) dairy workers from the Duchies. Already at this time, he noted that in 
northern Jutland many farms had switched from oxen-raising to dairying. He stressed that 
important articles on dairying from the Duchies were reprinted all over Denmark, and, as 
suggested in the quote above, he predicted that Denmark would eventually converge on the 
Duchies (Kohl 1846, pp. 58-60). 
Kohl also argued that the improvements in production and hygiene implemented through the 
Holstein system of dairying were explicitly to satisfy English tastes, the English being a ‘peculiar 
people who want everything according to their mind and according to whose command and 
impulse in our national economies of Continental Europe more things are being reformed and 
changed than we generally notice.’ As an example he cites that even the firkins used for 
transporting the butter had to conform to Irish standards and mimicked their size and shape, 
25
 At that time, as we have seen, Denmark proper was still very much centered on cattle fattening in Jutland and 
the export of grains to England in particular. 
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although certain larger estates added their own mark to the firkins, and already had a ‘very 
good’ reputation in Britain (Kohl 1846, pp. 63-69).26  
As an interim conclusion, we see that the Danish dairy industry was only in its beginnings until 
the 1840s, and can largely be seen as an extension of the Schleswig and Holstein dairy sector 
which was focused on supplying both to Hamburg and via Hamburg to the growing British 
market, where, despite the butter tariff and Irish dominance, high quality butter from other 
countries of origin started being imported in increasing quantities. Within this context, Danish 
butter was mostly consumed in Denmark or exported to Norway, but occasionally made its way 
onto the British market from Jutland by land or via Kiel (or Lübeck) to Hamburg, from where the 
best qualities were then exported to England as Prima Kiel.27 
Accounts looking back at this period from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
stress that some Danish estates already produced high-quality ‘Holstein/Kiel butter’ by the 
1840s (Hollmann 1906, p.3). For example, the president of the Royal Agricultural Society of 
Denmark, Edward Tesdorpf (born in Hamburg in 1817), recalled in 1887 that he acquired the 
estate of Orupgaard on the island of Falster in 1840 and started to export butter to Hamburg 
soon afterwards, assisted by his father, who was a merchant. He also noticed that his butter 
was mixed with Holstein and Schleswig butter at that time, entering the marketing channels for 
that produce (Rützou 1887, 293). For this early period, butter traders mostly made long term 
contracts buying the whole production for fixed prices, distinguishing between summer and 
winter produce (Rützou 1887, 283-4). Danish merchant houses, especially the provincial 
merchants Boje (1977) studied for the period 1815-1847, showed some concentration among a 
selected group of traders on certain commodities, mostly grains, but without the emergence of 
fully specialized grocers (Boje 1977, pp. 96-100). He discusses the cases of individual merchants, 
among which probably that of Samuel Cohn from Ringkøbing in Jutland, whose exports were 
26
 However, and in line with later observations on Danish produce (Henriksen et al 2012), he remarks that the 
cheese produced was meager, thin and tasteless, but the pork, produced from whey and buttermilk, was of good 
quality (Kohl 1846, pp. 69-71). The British travel writer Laing (1852) gives similar observations from his travels to 
Denmark proper and the Duchies a few years later. 
27
 Direct exports from Denmark were only very occasional, using sailing ships (Schmidt 1870, 530, 532; Rützou 
1887, 283, 293).  
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concentrated on butter (53.7 percent), wool (22.7 percent) and hides and skins (18.7 percent) 
(Boje 1977, p. 96), is most interesting for us. Cohn had important business contacts in 
Amsterdam, where most of his wool went to, and in Altona, on which much of his other trade, 
including butter, was centered. Both in Amsterdam and Altona, larger merchant houses, 
Siepmann Peltersen and C.H. Donner, respectively, were acting as his commission agents and 
effectively financing his export trade. C.H. Donner was the only Altona-based merchant house 
among the leading Hamburg merchant bankers, its owner Conrad Hinrich Donner being a 
banker and private friend of Danish king Christian VIII (Böhme 1968, p. 80; Marchtaler 1959). 
These merchants then acted as wholesale traders and re-exporters to their counterparts on 
other markets, and provided Cohn with the commodities he imported into Denmark (Boje 1977, 
pp. 88-95), from the Netherlands this was mostly tobacco, while from Altona/Hamburg he got 
all sorts of industrial and colonial goods, especially tobacco, coffee and sugar, and 
manufactured commodities like cotton yarn, clothes and (linen) canvas (Boje 1977, p. 119). The 
Danish shipping firm A. Berthelsen served as the link between Cohn and the foreign markets 
(Boje 1977, pp. 88-95). Within Denmark, Cohn was a large merchant who obtained his export 
commodities from a series of local merchants (Boje 1977, 142-46), producers and peddlers 
(known as prangere), who bought up local peasant production and mixed it to make 
transportation into the market towns profitable (Boje 1977, 155-60). 
Thus, in total, for the export of Danish butter to Britain we would observe at least six or seven 
middlemen between producer and consumer (see also Hollmann 1906) - this might help explain 
the large price differentials between butter in London and Copenhagen we observed above, 
and thus motivates the return to one of our central questions, as to what explains this trade via 
Altona and Hamburg. Of course, between Danish locations and Altona, also costs of physical 
transport occurred. The main routes Danish butter would have taken would be through the 
Baltic Sea or via the North Sea. Through the Baltic Sea, exports were mainly by ship to Kiel, and 
from there to Hamburg via the Eider Canal or overland on streets; in 1844, the first railway in 
Greater Denmark was opened between Kiel and Altona. On the North Sea direct shipping from 
ports in Western Jutland would be the main choice. As to the relative use of these means, 
relatively little can be said due to the absence of trade statistics for the free port of Altona. 
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However, a glimpse is given in a pamphlet by J. Eduard Weber (1853) that contains a collection 
of Altona shipping and trade statistics for 1852. Among these, the reception of a total of 3,858 
tons (about 287 metric tons), 10400 ‘packages’, 7 barrels and 9 collies of butter is mentioned 
(Weber 1853, app. 2, p. IV). Of the tons, two thirds entered by sea, and one third via the Altona-
Kiel railway.28 In a different table (p. 41), the seaward transport from Danish ports into Altona 
of butter, 30 ships with a total load of 286.5 Last, is mentioned. Of this total load, 211 (73.6 
percent) had arrived from Denmark proper and most of the rest from Schleswig. After ‘diverse 
commodities’, butter was in quantity terms the most salient import from Denmark proper via 
sea, twice as large as imports of barley. While it is difficult to extract precise weights from these 
numbers, it seems that Danish butter exports to Altona in 1852 were mostly by ship, but 
railway also might have transported a substantial share.29  
Apart from the integration of top Danish produce into Holstein butter distribution chains, 
Hamburg’s relatively beneficial financial and economic situation after the Napoleonic Wars 
needs to be considered. Like Copenhagen and the Danish economy and financial sector, it had 
been hit severely by the Continental Blockade, but contrary to the Danish experience, British 
merchants relatively quickly invested in the city when trade recovered after the war in order to 
reestablish this main access point for Northern and Central European markets via the Elbe 
River. At this time, both Copenhagen and Danish provincial merchants became dependent on 
credit and financing from Hamburg’s merchant bankers to the extent that the new Danish 
currency, the Rigsbankdaler, which emerged from state bankruptcy and currency crisis in 1813, 
was pegged to Hamburg’s mark banco. Thus, according to the classic account by Svend Aage 
Hansen (1984, p. 112-16), in common with the example of Samuel Cohn given above, the 
28
 Of the ‘packages’, 99 percent entered by train either from Kiel (74%) or on the Berlin-Hamburg railway (25&%) 
that connected Altona to Mecklenburg and the Prussian capital. 
29
 In 1852, according to the data in table 2, Denmark exported 4670 tønder of butter to Altona. The mentioned 211 
Last (as Hamburg Commerzlast) would be equivalent to 4064 tønder of 112 kg after deducting 13 percent tara. This 
would represent 87 percent of Danish exports to Altona. The seaward imports of butter (total) in the other table, c. 
2563 tønder, are clearly below that; if 84.5 percent of them were from Denmark proper, they would represent 46 
percent of Danish exports to Altona. The total weight of the railway traffic to Altona in butter is difficult to 
determine due to the different measures, and the share of Danish butter on the Kiel-Altona railway is unknown, as 
is the share of Danish butter in ships or carts arriving from Schleswig or Holstein. 
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around the Duchies and into Denmark proper in 1851, he noted how steamships from Glasgow 
united the Duchies and the Kingdom, so that, for example, ‘the passage from Kiel to 
Copenhagen, which was formerly a voyage of six or seven days, is now performed regularly in 
twelve hours’ and that ‘Steam power has made the most disjointed kingdom in Europe the 
most compact’ (Laing 1852, p. 291). 
As we have seen above, the First Schleswig War of 1848-51, which blocked the connection to 
Altona and much of the internal transport integration highlighted by Laing, inaugurated further 
initiatives for direct trade to Britain, among which direct trade with England in live cattle from 
Jutland was a main concern that now found backing by the Danish government. Previously, the 
lifting of the British cattle import ban in 1842 had already produced occasional direct trade, for 
example when the English steamer Tønning collected 100 steers for London (Møller 1998, p. 
93), and increased general interest in the matter, which however surpassed the scope for 
sustained private initiative in those years (see Poulsen 1851a,b), in part due to a transportation 
infrastructure that was still in development in this relatively sparsely populated part of 
Denmark.32 In the 1848-51 period the Danish government helped to establish a steamship 
connection between Hjerting (near Esbjerg in Southwest Jutland) and London (Bredkjær 1924-
32, p. 566; Drejer 1962, p. 26). In the following years until 1855, the steamship Jylland 
connected several points on the Jutland peninsula to London. However, the initiative was 
stopped in 1855 and the steamship sold off afterwards. The main problems seem to have been 
the difficulty of loading cattle without specialized harbor facilities, the lack of cargo for the 
return voyage from London, and possibly adaption costs to British demand and distribution 
structures. The government therefore decided to leave the business to private entrepreneurs.33  
32 For example, the main export point in the 1850s, Tønning in Southwest Schleswig, was only connected to the 
railway network in 1854 (Møller 1998, p. 93). 
33
 Bredkjær (1924-32), p. 566; Lassen (1883), 384-5. Apparently, the steamship finished its life as a post steamer in 
Korsør (Møller 1998, p. 94). 
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Although it is unclear if this steamship connection ever served to transport butter, the above 
discussion shows that by the late 1840s, the technical and organizational possibilities to 
establish direct trade with Britain were in place. However, our trade data above suggest that at 
this point in time the sudden reorientation experienced during the war had entailed transaction 
costs that were higher than those involved by the continued use of the Altona/Hamburg hub. 
Thus, we observe a certain return to the old pattern in the immediate postwar years. However, 
the underlying developments of Danish production, shipping and trading continued and, as we 
will see below, only a few years later, in the late 1850s, new, private initiatives surfaced that 
would establish the basis for a more sustained and successful second reorientation towards 
direct trade with Britain which was accelerated, but certainly not initiated, by the Second 
Schleswig War. 
3.2. The Emergence, Development, and Take Off of the Direct Trade with Britain from the 
1850s 
As noted above, the Second Schleswig War of 1864, when the Duchies, including Altona, were 
lost to Denmark, is seen as a defining moment in Danish history. In fact, a popular Danish 
children’s song recounts the death of a soldier in the war of 1864, and Danish commentators 
even today emphasize the importance of the war to the Danish psyche. Related to this, the 
traditional account of the rise of the Danish dairy industry focuses very much on the visible rise 
in exports after 1864. 
The common story is thus very much one of a sudden break and reorientation with a rise of the 
dairy industry and its exports from almost zero to a considerable size over the next two 
decades. The standard textbook account by Svend Aage Hansen (1984, p. 187) attributes the 
breakthrough of Danish exports of butter and pork in the 1860s to the expansion of 
transportation facilities, of particular importance to be the decision in 1868 to establish a major 
harbor in Esbjerg on the west coast of Jutland explicitly to obviate the need to ship through 
Altona and Hamburg.  
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We argue, however, that a number of events coincided and cumulated over a longer period 
before and after 1864, which were to make the Hamburg trade less attractive and favored the 
establishment of the direct trade. The visible outcome was the opening of new direct steamship 
routes and the increasing involvement of both Danish and British merchants, who substituted 
for the services previously provided by those in Hamburg. This fits with the observation that 
Esbjerg harbor was only to open fully in 1874. Besides the continuing growth and 
professionalization of the Danish dairy industry and the continued growth in incomes and 
demand on the British market stressed above, we see three major contributing factors that 
enabled private initiative to become more effective over the course of the 1850s and 1860s.  
First, the Sound Toll, which for centuries had been a mainstay of Danish government finances, 
was capitalized and abolished in 1857 after pressure from the United States. This instantly 
made access to Copenhagen less expensive for ships sailing from the North Sea and through the 
Kattegat, thus changing its attractiveness relative to Hamburg for exports to Britain (C.K. 
Hansen 1956, p. 10). This reinforced the increase in trade and transportation between England 
and Scotland and the Baltic, and the role of Copenhagen as a stop off point. In 1857 three 
steamers (the L.N. Hvidt, Thor, and Odin) were circulating between England (Grimsby) and the 
Baltic, taking coal and other cargo from Britain and products from the Baltic Sea, as well as 
passengers (emigrants) for Cornelius Peter August Koch’s ‘General Danish Steamship Company’ 
of Copenhagen (see Vestberg 1933, pp. 22-23), one of the constituent companies of the later 
shipping giant DFDS (Møller 1998, p. 94). Other initiatives were in preparation, for example C.K. 
Hansen’s negotiations with the the Leith Hull & Hamborg Steam Packet Co for a regular 
connection to Leith in Scotland, which failed in the beginning, but were successful in the early 
1860s, after the Scottish company changed hands to James Currie in 1862 (C.K. Hansen, p. 24). 
Second, as we can be seen be seen above, the British import tariffs on butter and other 
agricultural and livestock commodities fell considerably during the 1850s and were finally 
abolished in 1860. 
Third, the commercial and credit crisis of 1857 had hit Hamburg and Altona merchant bankers 
particularly hard. After spreading through the US and to London during that year it arrived in 
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Hamburg, the trade and finance hub between London, the German hinterland, Denmark and 
Sweden in November 1857 (Ahrens 1978, pp. 6-8; Böhme 1968, pp. 88-89). In Hamburg, due to 
the lack of public paper money, a partly dubious chain of bills of exchange had let to a strong 
increase in credit and money in circulation that suffered a sudden stop in liquidity and 
interbank transactions when the crisis arrived. Several private and public-private joint 
incentives to guarantee bills of exchange and stabilize the central merchant banking houses 
failed (Ahrens 1978, pp. 10-22; Böhme 1968, pp. 86-98), before a loan of 100 million Mark 
banco in silver from the Vienna Staatsbank, provided via the Austrian government, was used to 
back and recapitalize five key merchant houses, among them C.H. Donner of Altona (Böhme 
1968, pp. 94, 99-101; Ahrens 1978, pp. 22-26). Although the crisis was mostly solved by late 
December 1857, international trust in the Hamburg currency for transaction and the 
functioning of the Hamburg credit market was considerably reduced and in consequence, 
Hamburg lost a large part of its role as trading and financial hub to London (Böhme 1968, pp. 
102-104). As Danish connections with the UK increased, merchants could thus increasingly look 
to London for services which had previously been provided by Hamburg. 
Fourth, other trading costs were of course also falling as the first era of globalization 
proceeded. In particular, the telegraph made information much more readily available. In the 
Danish case, the first international connection was to Hamburg/Altona and opened in 1854. In 
1855 Denmark was connected to Norway and in 1860 to England. This reduced information 
costs considerably and freed the flow of information from the flow of physical transport, whose 
density was still higher in Hamburg than in anywhere in Denmark in the 1860s. Moreover, we 
have already emphasized the importance of steam shipping, which was gradually replacing sail 
technology over this period. As is also apparent from the quote by Laing above, steam shipping 
offered advantages in terms of cost and reliability particularly, early on, over shorter routes 
(Harley 1971, Horby and Nilsson 1980). 
The emergence of the Danish export trade was observed by contemporaries like the British 
Vice-Consul in Copenhagen, Rainals, who summarized the situation in a report in 1860. He 
described how ‘Denmark cannot lay claim to be considered a commercial country as the term is 
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usually understood.’ Tellingly, however, he noted that Denmark was well positioned to enjoy a 
trade with England, and suggested making a harbor for direct export to England, thus avoiding 
the Hamburg middlemen (Rainals 1860, p. 273-274), a point also made by another 
contemporary British commentator, Wilson (1867, pp. 81-2). At the same time, Rainals’ report 
clearly shows that despite increased production and domestic consumption34, the vast majority 
of Danish dairy produce still needed to aspire to higher quality to be ready for exportation. He 
stressed the ‘inferior quality’ of most peasant produce and described their butter as ‘execrably 
bad… strongly salted with the commonest salt, whilst in its preparation so little regard is paid to 
the proper extraction of the whey or even to cleanliness that it appears strange that such 
produce can find a sale’. Other foreign observers like the Italian, Pietrocòla-Rossetti, and the 
Frenchman, Tisserand, both writing in the mid-1860s, noted similar things, also stressing that 
Denmark consumed and produced much butter (Tisserand 1865, pp. 15-16), and that there was 
‘very good milk and excellent butter’ available (Pietrocòla-Rossetti 1864, p. 256). 
A group of Danish merchants, shipping entrepreneurs and estate owners focused on producing 
high quality butter, like the aforementioned Edward Tesdorpf, and worked simultaneously and 
sometimes jointly on the improvement, marketability and export of Danish butter, thereby 
providing the incentives for quality improvement of the vast majority of the butter produced 
and the possibility to earn profits by selling the butter outside Denmark, reducing transaction 
costs and the number of middlemen and their share in the value added. Here we mention a few 
of the most important. 
Philip Wulff Heymann (1837-1893)35, who later cofounded the Tuborg brewery in 1873, started 
his business career with a firm selling butter to Britain a couple of years after its foundation in 
1858. In 1864 he was the first to pack butter in cans for export, and in 1866 he cofounded 
34
 He notes that the consumption of butter in Denmark is ‘extremely large, amounting on an average to from 28 to 
30 lbs per head per annum so that greater importance is attached to quantity than to quality’. Only the higher 
classes and foreign importers got to enjoy good quality produce and that ‘the same rule applies to cattle: the worst 
are sent to provincial towns, the better to Copenhagen, the next best to Hamburg, and the best to England’.  
35
 See his biography by Pedersen et al (2005). 
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Københavns Svineslagteri (Copenhagen’s Pig Slaughterhouse) (Meyer 1916). His butter export 
firm was path-breaking for exports to the UK, and primarily supplied canned butter to troops. 
He was followed by J. Ankerstjerne in Randers and Hans Broge in Aarhus and these merchants 
were key in promoting the sort of quality improvements in dairying which later were to allow 
the cooperative movement such a successful entrance to the market in the 1880s (Hansen 
1984, p. 190). Hans Broge was particularly involved in promoting butter exhibitions in Danish 
provincial towns, including the first exhibition of winter butter (Dybdahl 1946, p. 73). He was 
also, together with the estate owner Valentiner of the Gjeddesdal estate near Copenhagen – 
another early producer of quality butter36 – an enthusiastic promoter of the establishment of 
centralized fællesmejerier (proprietary creameries) in every village to promote uniform quality 
butter production and packing to raise the quality of peasant butter beyond the taste and smell 
described by Vice-Consul Rainals above (Dybdahl 1946, p. 87; Andresen 1992, p. 15). 
Another pioneering merchant in Denmark was Gunni Busck, Jr. (see Hertel 1889, pp. 264-5), 
who entered the tinned butter trade in the early 1870s and established the Scandinavian 
Preserved Butter Company in 1874, exporting canned butter primarily to troops (Brix 1924, p. 
22). He founded the first private creamery in Denmark, Slagelse Mejeri, in 1875, and he also 
helped found the Copenhagen Milk Supply Københavns mælkeforsyning in 1877 (Brix 1924, pp. 
24-7).  
Finally, another important figure in this story of increasing Danish competence in foreign trade 
and shipping was the merchant Christian Kjellerup Hansen, who had started his own trading 
company in 1856 and first dealt with salt and coal for British steamships on their return voyage 
from the Baltic (C.K. Hansen 1856, p. 15), but with the increasing shipping activity soon 
expanded into trade with Danish and Swedish agricultural produce (grains, flour, feedstuffs, 
sprits and butter) to the same ships he provided coal to (C.K. Hansen 1956, p. 17, 20).  
36
 Heinrich Christian Valentiner (born in Schwensby near Flensburg in Schleswig in 1767) had acquired Gjeddesdal 
in 1822, being another part of the movement of farmers from the Duchies into Denmark. His son Adolph took over 
the estate after his death in 1831 and introduced modern dairying. Under him and his son Heinrich Nicolai, owner 
of the estate since 1866, Gjeddesdal became a model and experimental estate and a pioneer in the introduction of 
many innovations in dairying (Andresen 1992). 
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As we have seen before, in 1859 C.K. Hansen tried unsuccessfully to establish a regular 
steamship connection between Copenhagen and Leith in Scotland. Also, in 1859, he acquired 
the steamship ‘El Ole’, built in Newcastle, to establish a regular steamship connection to that 
port. However, this initiative also seems to have been unsuccessful, since he tried to sell the 
ship soon afterwards, and then it was mostly used between Copenhagen and Northern Zealand. 
(C.K. Hansen 1956, p. 18, 37). In 1863, just before the Second Schleswig War, he finally reached 
agreement with the James Currie and Co steamship company for a connection to Leith and in 
the same year he also established the first regular steamship connection to Newcastle and in 
1872 to Hull (C.K. Hansen, p. 18).37 The new routes from Copenhagen to Leith, negotiated by 
Hansen personally, started on July 15, 1863 from Leith. The trips were made by two steamships, 
Snowdoun and Gnome, and were announced in the Danish press every day (C.K. Hansen, pp. 
22-26, 35).  
Based on this account, it is difficult to argue that the war was the only reason for the refocus 
away from Hamburg. The loss of the Duchies did, however, reinforce the interest in the direct 
connection to Britain among Danish farmers (Bech 1865) and brought back to memory the 
experiences with the connection from Jutland in the early 1850s (Boye 1865). Thus, in the 
spring of 1865, C.K. Hansen and Tesdorpf as president of the Royal Agricultural Society 
negotiated rates for transporting live cattle, and this trade started in 1864 (C.K. Hansen, p. 27). 
In summer 1865, Aarhus was included in the routes, and in 1867 also Nyborg in the East of 
Funen was a destination for some time (C.K. Hansen, p. 24).  
Part of the mythology surrounding 1864 appears to be due to the fact that in later years, and in 
the classical historical accounts on the establishment of direct trade to England, Tesdorpf and 
the Royal Agricultural Society took and received large credit for the establishment of the 
steamship route, although their main contribution was simply negotiating the possibility of live 
37
 During the 1864 war, he was required to transport troops for the Danish government, for which he chartered 
steamships from Thos. Wilson and Sons in Hull (C.K. Hansen, p. 18, 24). 
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cattle exports.38 Via its periodical publication, the Tidskrift for Landøkonomi, the Royal 
Agricultural Society promoted the new connection among estate owners (see Tesdorpf 1865) 
and sent observers with the steamship on every single voyage until the fall of 1866, who wrote 
short reports for the journal on the voyage and market conditions in Leith (Westring 1866). 
When Tesdorpf announced the conditions at a meeting in spring 1865, he stressed that this 
new connection presented a general change for Danish agriculture in which the large farmers 
should forge ahead, although they might have to suffer initially from the considerable sunk 
costs of market exploration involved (Tesdorpf 1865, p. 234). The discussion that followed at 
the meeting in this account (ibid., pp. 244-50) shows the increased awareness among the 
leading Danish farmers and agricultural experts about the link between the quality and 
exportability of produce to the British market. 
In the late 1860s, weekly market reports from Leith and other destinations in Britain continued 
to be transmitted by Hansen’s company and were published in the leading newspapers 
Berlingske Tidende and Dagstelegrafen (C.K. Hansen, p. 27). The weekly agricultural periodical 
Ugeskrift for Landmænd also published regular market reports from Leith into the 1870s. As a 
consequence, already in 1870, export merchants had an important presence on the 
Copenhagen market and demanded high quality butter - and not only for the aforementioned 
trade in tinned butter (Schmidt 1870, pp. 533-535). By 1870, the focus on direct butter exports 
to Britain had also rapidly spread to Jutland and to Odense on Funen, where a Scottish 
merchant had established a business, and to Lolland-Falster, i.e. the whole Kingdom of 
Denmark (Schmidt 1870, pp. 535-6). Most of the exports continued to go to Scotland and 
38
 See for example Rützou (1887), pp. 283-4; Lassen (1883), p. 386; Bredkjær (1924-32), pp. 567-8. Lassen also 
gives detailed accounts of the numbers of different animals transported (horses, bulls, cows, calves, sheep, pigs, 
1865-67, 1874-1882, pp. 389-90, 395), the size of the ships, voyage durations, and new routes established by the 
original company (J. Currie of Leith) and others to Hull, Newcastle and other destinations from both Copenhagen 
and ports in other parts of the country like Aalborg, Aarhus and Esbjerg. For 1865, he also mentions the total 
butter transported (p. 389). In 1870, Danish steamers also went with cattle and grain in London (Møller et al 1998, 
p. 92).
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Northern England, but in winter the London market was also taken advantage of, since Ireland 
and the Netherlands produced little butter during those months – a clear indication of the early 
spread of winter production of quality butter in Denmark (Schmidt 1870, pp. 531-2), which was 
later one of the factors which allowed Denmark to forge ahead of other producers (Henriksen 
and O’Rourke 2005). These early developments meant that Danish butter was already well 
known in the UK, long before the cooperatives came onto the scene to exploit this in the 1880s 
(Dybdahl 1946, p. 100). 
Finally, we might ask what became of the Duchies, which had been the early leaders in the 
development of modern dairying in Denmark. According to Hansen (1994), they then became 
part of the protected German market, where they did not have to compete with the world and 
did not develop as fast. In many respects, however, they seem to have developed in parallel 
with Denmark, although new innovations now flowed south rather than north. Dairy 
consultants were hired from Denmark, and the first cooperative creamery was founded in 1884, 
just two years after the first opened in Denmark. 
4. Conclusion
As well as quantifying as far as possible what we can know about the early Danish trade in 
butter, the aim of this paper was to answer two key questions. First, why Denmark exported via 
Hamburg, despite the significant cost from the middlemen involved, and second, why and how 
this changed, so that the direct trade with England was established. This example demonstrates 
the potential benefits of escaping traditional trading patterns and bringing home the high value 
added part of the export trade for developing countries, but it also provides a warning: path 
dependency can make the costs of such a shift very high indeed, and in the present case it was 
only war which meant that the decisive leap was taken. The policy implication might then be 
that foreign aid could be directed towards establishing adequate credit and trading institutions 
and facilities in developing countries, even though this might be at the expense of developed 
world hubs and clusters. While investments in transport and port infrastructure might seem 
most important at first sight, we expect the real relevance to lie in developing domestic 
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capacities for direct market discovery and the facilitation of contacts and networks that enable 
the dissemination of relevant information on specific demand in foreign markets and to 
establish first-hand contacts between domestic producers and distributors with potential 
foreign importers.  
We have disputed the traditional story of how Denmark saw new horizons after 1864, and have 
demonstrated that, although there was indeed a decisive shift in the pattern of trade after this 
date, the origins go back somewhat further. The importance of the British market was already 
established from the early nineteenth century, and markets were integrated even before this. 
Modern dairy practices were spreading into Denmark proper already in the 1840s, making more 
and more Danish butter suitable for export. Initially this trade went primarily through the 
Hamburg hub because it paid to do so. Changes in the viability of the port of Copenhagen, UK 
tariff policy, and falling transportation costs began to change this already in the 1850s, and 
direct steamship connections with Britain began to be established from this time. Certainly the 
war helped provide an extra stimulus to these developments, but it seems that they were 
already well underway in any case. This might be a blow to the Danish national story, but a 
positive view might be that it was the hard work and vision of many ‘great Danes’, and not 
sudden soul-searching after defeat in war, which brought about the transformation of the 
economy which was to lead to the rapid and successful development of Denmark. 
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Appendix – Specification Tests 
(1a) 
Single-equation diagnostics using reduced-form residuals: 
CPH-Funen  : Normality test:  Chi^2(2) =  1.3044 [0.5209] 
CPH-Funen  : Portmanteau( 6):  Chi^2(4)  =  2.4015 [0.6624] 
Hamburg  : Normality test:  Chi^2(2) =  2.0565 [0.3576] 
Hamburg  : Portmanteau( 6):  Chi^2(4)  =  1.2052 [0.8772] 
LON_C  : Normality test:  Chi^2(2) =  1.5943 [0.4506] 
LON_C  : Portmanteau( 6):  Chi^2(4)  =  3.1716 [0.5295] 
Vector Normality test:  Chi^2(6) =  6.3652 [0.3835] 
Vector Portmanteau( 6):  Chi^2(36) =  39.357 [0.3220] 
(1b) 
Single-equation diagnostics using reduced-form residuals: 
CPH-Torve  : Normality test:  Chi^2(2) = 0.44942 [0.7987] 
CPH-Torve  : Portmanteau( 6): Chi^2(4) =  3.3951 [0.4940] 
Hamburg  : Normality test:  Chi^2(2) = 0.67712 [0.7128] 
Hamburg  : Portmanteau( 6): Chi^2(4) =  1.5920 [0.8102]  
LON_K&S  : Normality test:  Chi^2(2) =0.0088090 [0.9956] 
LON_K&S  : Portmanteau( 6): Chi^2(4) =  6.0240 [0.1974]  
Vector Normality test:  Chi^2(6) =  1.9288 [0.9261]  
Vector Portmanteau( 6): Chi^2(36) =  49.829 [0.0624] 
(2) 
Single-equation diagnostics using reduced-form residuals: 
CPH-Estate : Normality test:  Chi^2(2) = 0.95876 [0.6192] 
CPH-Estate : Portmanteau( 6): Chi^2(4) =  8.7922 [0.0665] 
Hamburg  : Normality test:  Chi^2(2) = 0.26397 [0.8764] 
Hamburg  : Portmanteau( 6): Chi^2(4) =  7.0115 [0.1353] 
LON_K&S  : Normality test:  Chi^2(2) = 0.38474 [0.8250] 
LON_K&S  : Portmanteau( 6): Chi^2(4) =  2.6718 [0.6142] 
Vector Normality test:  Chi^2(6) =  8.8382 [0.1829]  
Vector Portmanteau( 6): Chi^2(36) =  43.418 [0.1846] 
